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governmentality
Jonas Thiel*
Manchester Metropolitan University, UK
The UK National Student Survey (NSS) has high status on the agenda of UK universities. Its rise
in status is linked to its influence on national rankings and associated funding streams referenced to
the Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF). Consequently, many universities have implemented
further assessments of student satisfaction, thereby putting additional internal performative pres-
sures on courses and individual lecturers. The research contribution of this article comprises an
analysis of the NSS through Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’, with a particular focus on his
work on ‘discipline’ and ‘neo-liberal governmentality’. More specifically, by utilising qualitative
data from interviews, research diaries and observations, it will be demonstrated how the NSS
functions as a ‘disciplinary’ technology of government which subjects lecturers, departments and
universities to intersecting panoptic gazes and perpetual ratings. In addition, the NSS can also be
considered ‘neo-liberal’ in that it governs the academic population through narrow conceptions of
‘freedom’ and omnipresent competition. The article proposes that it is through the amalgamated
forces of intersecting panoptic gazes, on the one hand, and neo-liberal free-market principles, on
the other, that student feedback develops its power to govern.
Keywords: Foucault; discipline; governmentality; student evaluations of teaching; National
Student Survey; neoliberalism
Introduction
In the UK, one could assume that steep hierarchies between students and academic
teaching staff are a relic of the past. What used to be a clearly defined pyramidal order
has given way to an egalitarian system of students judging their courses through the
National Student Survey (NSS), an online questionnaire which purports to give
‘students a powerful collective voice to help shape the future of their course and their
university or college’ (Ipsos MORI, 2006). Democracy prevails. This article, how-
ever, asks the critical question of whether the NSS and resultant institutional student
appraisal systems are only democratic on the surface whilst surreptitiously producing
collateral not visible to the naked eye. To approach this question, this article utilises
Foucault’s work on ‘governmentality’, with a particular focus on his understanding of
‘neo-liberal governmentality’ (Foucault, 2008, p. 193) and ‘discipline’ (Foucault,
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1977). It is suggested that student feedback systems could be understood as a hybrid
governmental technology, which makes use of both disciplinary and neo-liberal
governmentalities. It will be argued that the NSS thus produces lecturer subjectivities
that become ‘competitised’, ‘responsibilised’ and hence ‘governable’.
To enquire into the governmental effects of student feedback systems, this article
first outlines the published literature on student feedback systems. Second, the
article’s methodology is presented. Third, the NSS is analysed through Foucault’s
notions of hierarchical observation, normalising judgement and examinations.
Fourth, Foucault’s work on liberal and neo-liberal governmentality is used to show
how the NSS governs through narrow conceptions of ‘freedom’ and ‘competition’.
The article concludes by showing how the NSS could best be understood as a disci-
plinary and neo-liberal hybrid.
Context: The National Student Survey
First implemented in 2005, the NSS claims to be ‘a high-profile census of nearly half
a million students across the UK’, directed at undergraduate students in their final
year of study (Ipsos MORI, 2006). Whilst Ipsos MORI, a private ‘global research
company’ is entrusted with its implementation (Ipsos MORI, 2006), the survey ‘asks
27 questions, relating to eight aspects of the student experience’ (Ipsos MORI,
2018). In addition, students provide ‘positive and/or negative comments in an open-
ended question’ (Ipsos MORI, 2018).
In an international context, the NSS could be understood as the British attempt to
implement what is commonly referred to as student evaluations of teaching (SETs)
(Cheng & Marsh, 2010). Similar SETs can hence be found in other countries, such
as the Australian Course Evaluation Questionnaire (CEQ) (Kane et al., 2008,
p. 136), the US National Survey of Student Engagement (NSSE) (Kuh, 2009) or the
Center for Higher Education University Ranking in Germany (Center for Higher
Education, 2017).
The NSS has had a powerful impact on higher education institutions (HEIs)
(Agnew et al., 2016) and their lecturers (Jones et al., 2014; Thiel, 2018). This impact
has been exacerbated by the 2016 introduction of the UK Teaching Excellence
Framework (TEF), which partially utilises NSS data to then allocate a ‘gold, silver or
bronze award’ to universities. These TEF ratings, in return, may allow English uni-
versities to raise their tuition fees (Higher Education Funding Council for England,
2017). Beyond the TEF, the NSS also influences higher education rankings, such as
the Times/Sunday Times ‘Good University Guide’, the Complete University Guide
(Jobbins et al., 2008) and the Guardian ‘University Guide’ (Friedberg, 2016). On the
one hand, these rankings are increasingly cited by future students and university staff
as having an impact on their choices of universities (Locke, 2011, p. 201). On the
other hand, however, other publications have suggested that universities may attach
more meaning to the rankings ‘than the data alone may bear’, whilst influencing both
‘their strategic decision-making and more routine management processes’ (Locke,
2014, p. 77).
Turning to the critical literature regarding SETs, some authors have focused on
their gender bias (Boring, 2017), whilst other research has focused on the lack of
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validity of national SETs by critically interrogating the correlation between higher
grades and higher marks (Brockx et al., 2011). A more significant body of work has
critiqued SETs in the context of the ongoing ‘marketisation of higher education’
(Jones-Devitt & Samiei, 2011; Molesworth et al., 2011) and neo-liberalism
(Grimmett et al., 2009; McGettigan, 2013; Giroux, 2014). For example, McGetti-
gan (2013, p. 55) suggests that the NSS, and resultant rankings, intend to put
‘consumer pressures’ on universities to improve quality and offer ‘value for money’,
with the exact meaning of value becoming somewhat overdetermined (McGettigan,
2013, p. 55). Likewise, Naidoo and Williams (2014b, p. 1) conceptualise the NSS
within the process of students being recast into consumers. This goes alongside a
range of effects. First, students, due to their new-found customer status, are ‘always
right [and] the university had better listen to the student’ (Furedi, 2011, p. 3).
Second, universities are no longer seen as a public good, but as a service which can be
bought (Naidoo & Williams, 2014a, p. 1). Third, students become increasingly
passive, which reduces the quality of courses as well as taught provision becoming less
creative (also see Naidoo & Williams, 2014a). Fourth, an increase in competitive
behaviour amongst staff exacerbates pressures on middle managers, such as heads of
departments (Parker, 2014). Importantly, these managers may question the quality
of the NSS as a reliable assessment instrument, but are, nevertheless, required to
respond to its results by ensuring blind staff responsiveness (Parker, 2014).
Conceptual framework: Foucault’s ‘governmentality’
This section introduces Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’, a neologism first
mentioned in his 1978 lecture series ‘Security, Territory, Population’ (Foucault,
2009). Importantly, Foucault’s understanding of governmentality developed from a
‘historically determinate’ version in the beginning of his lecture series towards ‘a more
general and abstract’ version (Foucault, 2009, p. 502). Whilst the former version
denotes ‘liberal’ (Foucault, 2008, p. 22) and ‘neo-liberal governmentality’ (p. 193),
the latter can best be understood in its plural form (i.e. as governmentalities or ‘tech-
nologies of government’) (Lemke, 2002, p. 53). Hence, Foucault’s notions of the
Christian pastorate (Foucault, 2009), ‘sovereign power’ (Foucault, 1977, p. 48),
‘disciplinary power’ (Foucault, 1977, p. 187), ‘liberalism’ (Foucault, 2009, p. 51)
and ‘neo-liberalism’ (Foucault, 2008, p. 117) can all be understood as different
governmentalities (i.e. as ‘different technologies of government’) (Lemke, 2002,
p. 53). This article theorises the NSS in the context of two specific governmentalities:
(i) the ‘disciplines’ (Foucault, 1977) and (ii) liberal and neo-liberal governmentality
(Foucault, 2008).
Disciplinary governmentality. Foucault’s (1977) ‘disciplines’ comprise (i) hierarchical
observation, (ii) normalising judgement and (iii) examinations. First, the notion of
‘hierarchical observation’ describes the effect that observation has on humans
(Foucault, 1977, p. 170): if humans think that they might be watched, they are more
likely to be compliant. This principle of ‘eyes that must see without being seen’
(p. 171) is captured in Foucault’s description of Jeremy Bentham’s prison design of
the Panopticon, which operates as follows: A watchtower is situated in the centre of a
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circular prison building, a position from which prison guards have a clear view of the
inmates’ activities. Akin to ‘venetian blinds’ covering the windows, the watchtower’s
design prevents the inmates from being able to see the activities of the prison guards
(p. 201). Hence, the prisoners can never be sure whether they are currently being
watched and, thus, simply need to assume that they are being permanently observed.
This observation technique uses what Foucault calls the panoptic gaze, a gaze which
puts the prisoners under perceived continuous surveillance which makes them com-
ply with the behavioural expectations of the prison. Importantly, the principle of
hierarchical observation within the Panopticon can be extended in a pyramidal
fashion (i.e. by ‘supervising its own mechanisms’) (p. 204). For example, in the
central tower, the director may spy on all the employees that he has under his orders: . . .
and it will even be possible to observe the director himself. An inspector arriving unexpect-
edly at the centre of the Panopticon will be able to judge at a glance . . . how the entire
establishment is functioning. (Foucault, 1977, p. 204)
In short, the prisoners are under hierarchical observation from the prison guards,
whilst the prison guards themselves are under similar observation from the prison
director. This pyramidal principle may describe the workings of many institutions,
with senior personnel observing ‘lower-ranking’ employees.
Moving on, normalising judgement describes the power of normalisation on the
subject: people are judged ‘by where their actions place them on a ranked scale that
compares them to everyone else’ (Gutting, 2006, p. 84). For example, the eigh-
teenth-century Ecole Militaire was separated into classes known as ‘the very good’,
‘the good’, the ‘mediocres’, ‘the bad’ and ‘the shameful’ (Foucault, 1977, p. 181). It
was through being able to compare these classes to—and differentiate them from—one
another; through having the capacity to hierarchically order them (with a homogenising
effect); and through excluding certain classes by making them into the abnormal—as
in the example of the ‘shameful’ class of the Ecole Militaire’ (p. 183)—that normalis-
ing judgement unleashed its disciplinary effects. Importantly, only ‘merit and
behaviour’ (p. 182) were to influence the allocation to these classes. This fluidity
enabled a disciplining by rewards (e.g. through awarding ‘higher ranks and places’)
and punishment (‘by reversing this process’) (p. 181).
Lastly, Foucault (1977) suggests that the ‘examination’ combines both hierarchical
observation and normalising judgement. Importantly, by specifying the time (e.g.
timetables, activity durations) and space (e.g. positions in a room) in which individual
human bodies are expected to undertake specific bodily movements (e.g. whole-body
movements, gesture coordinations, tool usage, exercise regimes), discipline produces
what Foucault calls docile bodies (i.e. compliant subjects which are nevertheless pro-
ductive in achieving a certain task).
Liberal and neo-liberal governmentality. Foucault’s concept of ‘liberal governmental-
ity’ is first implied in the context of what Foucault terms ‘apparatuses of security’
(Foucault, 2009, p. 144). Importantly, ‘apparatuses of security’ are different from
‘sovereign power’ and ‘disciplinary power’ in that they enter a certain amount of
freedom into the art of governing by letting ‘things happen’ (p. 68). As an example,
Foucault discusses seventeenth and eighteenth-century French grain shortages,
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which frequently produced famines and hence posed significant risks to the ruling
elites due to the dangers of civil unrest. ‘It was precisely this kind of immediate
solidarity’ of this large-scale civil unrest that needed to be prevented (p. 63). Hence,
after various failed mercantilist policies of achieving low grain prices through ‘disci-
plinary mechanisms’ (p. 97), a group of scholars—the ‘physiocrats’—suggested that
famines may be avoided by introducing ‘laissez-faire’ into the art of governing by, for
example, allowing for prices to rise and then settle at the ‘just level’ (p. 444) based on
supply and demand. Crucially, the aim of economic ‘laissez-faire’ was not to prevent people
from dying of hunger in toto. Rather, the danger of a large-scale famine and ensuing
political instability was to be statistically assessed. Whilst ‘scarcity-scourges’ (i.e. fami-
nes) were to be avoided, the fact that certain individuals would starve constituted an
indispensable element of liberal governmentality:
the scarcity-scourge disappears . . . [the] scarcity that causes the death of individuals not
only does not disappear, it must not disappear. (Foucault, 2009, p. 64; emphasis added)
Moving on, Foucault suggests that neo-liberal governmentality partly builds upon and
partly deviates from liberal governmentality (Brown, 2015). It builds on liberalism by
safeguarding the ‘security of the natural phenomena of economic processes’ (Foucault,
2009, p. 451); yet, it deviates from liberalism’s conviction in government abstinence
and the ‘natural regulations’ of markets. Under neo-liberalism, markets are no longer
natural. Instead, it becomes the state’s responsibility to guarantee their ‘effective’ operation.
Foucault (2008, p. 118) first explores the non-naturalness of competition by examin-
ing ‘ordo-liberalism’ as an early form of neo-liberalism which—in comparison to classi-
cal economic theory—had a ‘radical anti-naturalistic conception of the market and of
the principle of competition’ (Lemke, 2001, p. 193). Ordo-liberals believed that lais-
sez-faire produced monopolisation and was hence to be rejected. Rather, competitive
markets needed to be ‘produced by an active governmentality’ (p. 121). The ‘Chicago
School’ then significantly built on ordo-liberalism by seeking to ‘universalise competi-
tion’ into all human relations (Lemke, 2001, p. 197). In this context, Foucault (2008)
evokes the concept of homo œconomicus as the self-interested, rational, autonomous,
entrepreneurial self who is in constant pursuit of enhancing his or her ‘human capital’
(Foucault, 2008). Crucially, this human capital is to be generated through humans’
‘capacity for self-control’ as an important ‘technology of the self’ (Lemke, 2002, p. 52).
Through self-control, individual associations, families and subjects become ‘responsi-
bilised’, as previous ‘social risks such as illness, unemployment, poverty and so forth’
now shift into issues of ‘self-care’ (p. 59).
In short, whilst the rise of liberal governmentality enabled the governing of the pop-
ulation by avoiding large-scale discontent through the introduction of laissez-faire,
the rise of neo-liberalism allowed for the governing of the population through the
active creation of competitive markets.
Methodology
This article originates from a research study which sought to capture the experiences
of university lecturers in education at two large post-1992 UK universities. Its data
stems from ‘free association narrative interviews’ (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000) with
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university lecturers; observations (cf. Jones & Somekh, 2004) of university lecturers’
teaching sessions; and two research diaries (one of which is autobiographical). All
data has been anonymised and participants have consented for their data to be used.
Paradigmatically, this article builds on Foucault’s conception of ontology in that it
understands reality as ‘the result of social practices and struggles over truth and objec-
tivity’ (Oksala, 2010, p. 445). Student feedback systems are hence an important part
of these struggles. In this context, knowledge does not ‘represent reality, but has
instead a productive role in shaping and configuring reality’ (Olsson & Petersson,
2008, p. 61). For example, the knowledge of lecturers’ student satisfaction ratings
has an important effect on how lecturers can subsequently be managed and disci-
plined. Similarly, knowledge is important in terms of ‘beliefs’. For instance, university
managers and lecturers have to believe that the NSS significantly influences student
intake so that universities put student feedback high on their agenda. A lack of belief,
conversely, would significantly reduce the power of this very feedback inside the insti-
tution, leaving only the inter-university market pressures of the NSS rankings intact.
Hence, this article treats the narratives of university lecturers as a crucial component
part of the operation of student feedback systems.
Analysis
The NSS is now analysed through Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’. First, it
will be shown how the NSS utilises disciplinary power (Foucault, 1977). Second, the
operation of liberal and neo-liberal governmentality (Foucault, 2008) within the NSS
will be elucidated.
The NSS as a disciplinary governmentality
Beginning with disciplinary governmentality, the NSS utilises both ‘hierarchical
(panoptic) observations’ as well as ‘normalising judgements’. More specifically, the
NSS is panoptic because there is a continual indeterminacy in terms of whether
students’ ‘observations’—over the duration of their undergraduate degree—somehow
find their expression in their final-year NSS. Similarly, there is a perpetual possibility
that an anonymous mass of people—such as parents, prospective students and other
stakeholders—may consult university NSS ratings online. Hence, just like in the
Panopticon, universities can never be sure whether their ‘performance’ is consulted
and, as a result, must assume continuous surveillance. Thus, they put significant
energy into attaining positive student ratings. Importantly, there is a temporal dimen-
sion to this type of panoptic observation which shifts the panoptic gaze from being
one of simultaneity (in the case of the prisoners) towards being ‘stretched out’ to a
panoptic time-window (in the case of the NSS) in which there is always a theoretical
chance that others might exercise their gaze.
Similarly, normalising judgement operates in that students judge their courses on a
Likert-type scale from one to five. This, in return, influences the standing of each
university in national rankings as well as whether universities are awarded gold, silver
or bronze ratings in the TEF. More specifically, normalising judgement ‘compares,
differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenises, [and] excludes’ (Foucault, 1977, p. 183):
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national rankings compare and differentiate university courses and universities; and
they measure ‘in quantitative terms and hierarchize [. . .]’ (Foucault, 1977, p. 183)
student satisfaction with their universities. This hierarchy homogenises universities in
that they increasingly make student feedback one of their priorities (Brown &
Carasso, 2013). Furthermore, national rankings exclude those universities situated
towards the lower end of the rankings (for example, by diminishing student demand
for these courses). Hence, a decrease in student satisfaction instantaneously puts
additional scrutiny on courses, as captured in Lisa’s diary entry:
Today the vice-chancellor sent an email to all staff about that the 2016 NSS results have
decreased by a few percentage points from 2015. Whilst praising those courses which managed to
increase their scores, he also said that the courses that attained negative student feedback must
make it their absolute priority to scrutinise their courses in order to attain better student feedback in
the future. (Excerpt 1—Lisa’s research diary)
Due to these external national pressures, universities have reconfigured internally.
For example, many universities have implemented internal surveys so that any negative
feedback can first be detected intra-institutionally before it materialises in the NSS
(Canning, 2017). For instance, Lisa’s university implemented biannual internal sur-
veys which were closely modelled on the NSS. Lisa writes:
In the internal survey, students also judge the modules. This puts quite a lot of pressure on module
leaders who are, in a way, made responsible if the score for the module dips below 80%. This
happened the other day. It all started when the module leader told us in a meeting that the module
dropped below 80%. He seemed agitated and identified a few lecturers who he thought would be
responsible for this negative student feedback. Apparently, students mentioned individual lecturers
in their internal surveys – even though they are directed not to. The module leader also said that in
student rep meetings, students complained about the same lecturers. [The module leader] said
that, as a result of the feedback, the degree leader gave them [the underperforming lecturers] a
stern talking to. Another outcome of this meeting was that they arranged weekly tutorials with
the module leader which they [i.e. the underperforming lecturers] had to attend. (Excerpt
2—Lisa’s research diary)
In this specific internal survey, normalising judgement operates in that students rate
individual modules which then places these modules ‘on a ranked scale that compares
them to’ the other modules (Gutting, 2006, p. 84). When one module failed to attain
the ‘minimal threshold’ (p. 182) of an 80% satisfaction rating, the module leader was
situated ‘in a network of writing’ (Foucault, 1977, p. 189): he had to produce an
action plan which outlined how he would attain positive student feedback in the
future. By failing to attain the 80% threshold, the module was branded ‘abnormal’
(p. 183), akin to Foucault’s description of the ‘shameful’ class in eighteenth-century
military schools (p. 182). This ‘shameful module’, interestingly, ‘only exist[ed]
to disappear’ (p. 182): the module leader was forced to produce an action plan
which outlined how the ‘shortcomings’ of the module would be addressed in the
future.
Turning to hierarchical observation, internal surveys are part of a ‘pyramidal’ func-
tioning of disciplinary power, with the only (albeit important) difference that students
fulfil the panoptic gaze on behalf of university management. Just like the prison guards
could be subjected to the panoptic gaze by the ‘prison director’ (p. 204), the module
leaders in Lisa’s example were subjected to their managers’ gazes. These managers,
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in return, may similarly be exposed to the panoptic gaze of university senior manage-
ment. Michael remarks:
Student voice is all they [senior management] ever think about [laughing]. As I said, we are
fine, but one of my mates from [another faculty] told me that they are under tremendous scrutiny
to get better satisfaction scores. (Excerpt 3—Interview with Michael; nurse educator)
Due to internal surveys, module leaders are encouraged to react to increasingly
fine-grained feedback which becomes possible through student representative meetings.
In these meetings, students are able to express satisfaction with individual lecturers.
For instance, in an interview with Rose, I enquired whether she ‘ever had any negative
experience with student feedback’. She answered:
Rose Hmm, I don’t know if I ever . . . um . . . actually ever struggled with student
feedback. I think I usually get quite good feedback actually.
Interviewer Oh really?
Rose Yeah, but I . . . um . . . I remember that it must be quite bad for some of my
colleagues because . . . somebody usually writes the minutes of these meetings.
Interviewer Are they?
Rose Yeah. So, each lecturer is given a score by students on how much they liked it.
And sometimes some . . . um . . . some colleagues don’t get a good score . . . the
students can look at [the minutes], but also, for example, [our course leader].
(Excerpt 4—Interview with Rose; teacher educator)
Just like the NSS and internal surveys, these student representative meetings again
utilise normalising judgements—that is, lecturers could compare their supposed teaching
quality to that of their colleagues—and panoptic observations (the minutes can be
downloaded by students and course leaders to ‘gaze at’).
In summary, universities, courses and lecturers are exposed to continuous panoptic
‘hierarchical observations’ and ‘normalising judgements’. These gazes are exercised
from a multitude of different origins, but are eventually channelled in a hierarchical
trajectory. That is, due to the pressures of ranking positions (i.e. normalising judge-
ment) in league tables, universities struggle with other universities over ranking posi-
tions derived from student satisfaction ratings. From here onwards, disciplinary
power predominantly functions in a pyramidical fashion which channels all the way
from the top of the institutional hierarchical structure to the bottom. That is, by
instrumentalising student feedback results, vice-chancellors and senior leadership use
‘hierarchical observation’ and ‘normalising judgement’ to discipline course leaders.
These, in return, do the same to module leaders who do the same to individual lectur-
ers. Hence, it can be argued that these combined ranking processes at various levels
of scale, in combination with hierarchical management structures, facilitate the disci-
plining of module leaders, courses, departments and universities. As a result, student
satisfaction becomes the primary guide of pedagogical practice:
I feel like I’m continuously thinking about student satisfaction. This really is at the heart of what I
do. I’m worried that I might attain negative student feedback, downhearted when I receive nega-
tive feedback and thrilled when I receive positive feedback . . . I feel like I permanently dance to the
hymn sheet of student voice. (Excerpt 5—Author’s research diary)
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The NSS as a liberal and neo-liberal governmentality
In addition to using discipline to govern lecturers, it is now suggested that the NSS
also functions as an ‘apparatus of security’ (as part of a wider liberal governmentality)
as well as a technology of ‘competition’ (as part of a neo-liberal governmentality). Start-
ing with the element of liberal governmentality, just as the physiocrats introduced
economic ‘freedom’ into the governing of the population, a similar freedom can also
be found in the governing of university staff:
This job [as a lecturer] is really hard, but what struck me is the incredible amount of freedom we
have here in comparison to when I worked at schools . . . (Excerpt 6—Interview with Emily;
teacher educator)
However, just as political economy significantly reframed ‘freedom’ as ‘economic
freedom’ (to exchange goods, to accumulate money, etc.), lecturers are ‘free’ to
engage in any activity as long as the teaching yields a ‘return on investment’ (Brown,
2015, p. 23), that is good student feedback. Lisa, for example, quotes a colleague who
suggested that:
As long as the students are happy, you can do whatever you want. (Excerpt 7—Lisa’s research
diary)
In other words, freedom becomes redefined as the freedom to achieve good student
feedback ratings and improved ranking positions on league tables. This, in return,
may lead to practices in which the anticipation of positive feedback constitutes the
main guiding principle of pedagogical decision-making:
When I’m planning for a session, I often think to myself, ‘Oh this is great. The students will really
like this and then hopefully will give me good feedback’. (Excerpt 8—Interview with Karl; tea-
cher educator)
Importantly, the introduction of ‘freedom’ is associated with collateral damage. That
is, just as the physiocrats calculated the deaths of a few citizens into their liberalised
trading practices, institutional feedback practices may already anticipate the redun-
dancy of those few individual lecturers who fail to produce expected student feedback:
Last year, I had a bit of a bad year really . . . I felt quite stretched with everything . . . and . . . um
. . . I also had a few student groups, I didn’t . . . didn’t quite get on with. So one day, I got invited
into [my line manager’s] office. I mean . . . I didn’t really get on with my [line manager] any-
way, but he told me that I needed to up my game if I wanted to continue my career at [Reddish
University]. And I thought to myself, that’s ridiculous you just don’t like me . . . but obviously
didn’t say that out loud. Anyway . . . I was trying . . . hard to get better feedback afterwards. I
mean, it worked, but that was very hard actually. (Excerpt 9—Interview with Rachel; teacher
educator)
These redundancies (real or simply threatened) are, importantly, not to be avoided,
but a rather necessary part of a liberal governmentality. That is, just as the physiocrats
asserted that as long as the majority of the population have enough food the deaths of
a few individuals are not only accepted but also necessary, redundancies are similarly
necessary because they may function as a ‘warning’ along the lines of ‘look what
happens when you fail to produce results’. Hence, the possibility of an ‘immediate
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solidarity’ (Foucault, 2009, p. 41) is not only minimised (i.e. colleagues are less likely
to step out of line), but the majority of lecturers may, indeed, work even harder to
attain positive ratings (e.g. Rachel was ‘trying . . . hard to get better feedback’). Fou-
cault’s quote above could hence be amended to:
the [mass redundancy] disappears . . . [the redundancy] that causes the [precarity] of indi-
viduals not only does not disappear, it must not disappear. (Foucault, 2009, p. 64; chan-
ged to suit analysis)
This production of collateral damage within the governing of academic populations
is also important for intra-institutional and inter-institutional practices. For example,
it could be hypothesised that university senior leadership may force the department
with the poorest ratings to close (see excerpt 3); however, as long as the whole univer-
sity attains better feedback, staff of other departments are less likely to mobilise. The
‘closed’ department simultaneously functions as a warning against solidary action as
well as producing an urgency for other departments to work harder. Similarly, a
university may fail to attract students due to bad feedback and hence may face closure
(Evans, 2018); however, as long as the rest of the UK university sector performs
better than this university—and it is in the nature of rankings that this is always the
case—widespread discontent in the UK university sector is prevented. Failing univer-
sities hence become a necessary and productive feature of the NSS and associated
rankings: the fear of becoming one of these bottom universities forces university
senior leaders into performative action (cf. Ball, 2003) to raise student satisfaction.
Moving to neo-liberalism, the NSS functions as a neo-liberal governmental tech-
nology by establishing competition at various levels of scale through the implementa-
tion of ‘market-shaped systems of action for individuals, groups and institutions’
(Lemke, 2001, p. 197). In these systems, first, entities (i.e. institutions, groups and
individuals) are pitched against one another in competitive struggles, whilst competi-
tions necessarily entail ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ (cf. Brown, 2015). Lisa, for example,
remarks:
I really don’t know but I can’t help to feel smug when I get better feedback than others. I don’t
think I’m usually very competitive, but when it comes to student feedback I can’t help to feel bril-
liant when students rate me as better than others. (Excerpt 10—Lisa’s research diary)
Second, departments are pitched against one another. For example, excerpt 3
illustrates that those departments with the worst student feedback are put under
increasing pressure to improve their feedback (and become a ‘winner’) or otherwise
face closure (and become a ‘loser’). In contrast, ‘winners’ may be ‘rewarded’ by the
removal of the threat of closure. For instance, Michael suggests:
My boss said that our university won’t shut our course down because of our amazing student feed-
back. (Excerpt 11—Interview with Michael; nurse educator)
Lastly, universities are pitched against one another in their pursuit of ‘customers’
(i.e. students). This purposeful (and hence neo-liberal) creation of competition is
reflected in the recent UK White Paper ‘Success as a knowledge economy’, which
praises the virtues of competitive markets (Department for Business, Innovation and
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Skills, 2016, p. 8). The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills asserts that ‘a
competitive market’ (p. 8) should be created because:
competition between providers in any market incentivises them to raise their game, offer-
ing consumers a greater choice of more innovative and better quality products and services
at lower cost. Higher education is no exception. (Department for Business, Innovation
and Skills, 2016, p. 8)
Interestingly, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills’ main reason to
expand competitive higher education markets is to increase economic performance,
in lieu of other potential reasons, such as personal fulfilment, equality, a desire to
learn, and so on. That is, just as the Chicago school demanded, all spheres of life—in
this case educational ones—are refigured in economic terms (cf. Foucault, 2008),
where competition seeks to ‘incentivise’ (i.e. force) universities to ‘raise their game’
and contribute to an overall higher ‘GDP’ (Department for Business, Innovation and
Skills, 2016, p. 8).
As part of this perpetual competition, the NSS fosters ‘entrepreneurial lecturers’
(cf. homo œconomicus) who are in constant pursuit of enhancing their human capital
(i.e. their ability to achieve good student feedback), along the lines of ‘do what you
want but take care that your human capital is adapted’ (Simons & Masschelein,
2008, p. 55). This, yet again, is captured in excerpt 7: ‘As long as the students are
happy, you can do whatever you want’. In addition, homo œconomicus requires the
development of certain ‘technologies of the self’: lecturers, departments and univer-
sities only become successful within the game of competition if they enhance their
‘capacity for self-control’ (Lemke, 2002, p. 52) and become ‘responsible’. For exam-
ple, ‘student satisfaction’ is not understood as a complex interplay of various (often
idiosyncratic) factors (e.g. student effort, small class sizes, sufficient funds to sur-
vive), but instead becomes the sole responsibility of lecturers, departments and uni-
versities (akin to ‘pupil progress’ becoming the sole responsibility of teachers in
schools):
What upsets me really, is that if you have a bad class, it’s still your responsibility. . . . they [man-
agement] still hold you to account if you don’t raise good student feedback . . . even if it’s actually
the students who are . . . the baddies really. (Excerpt 12—Interview with Rachel; teacher
educator)
In short, the responsibility for a positive ‘student experience’ is shifting towards
lecturers. This ‘responsibilisation’ also creates certain contradictions. For example,
counter to the neo-liberal avowal of the entrepreneurial self (cf. Brown, 2015), a risk-
averse self emerges:
After one of my taught English sessions, [a colleague] informed me that he had just had a
meeting with student representatives and that they were ‘really happy’ with my teaching. . .
[As a result of this feedback,] I . . . asked myself the question, ‘What can I do in the
future to attain the same good student feedback?’. I believe this was the moment when I also
started feeling a little trapped in my practice. That is, I wanted to continue teaching in a
similar fashion so that my students would continue to give me positive student feedback. . .
(Excerpt 13—Author’s research diary)
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That is, fully responsibilised lecturers may reason that in order to succeed (i.e. to
maintain good student feedback) one must recreate precisely those instances where
good feedback was obtained. This desire for good feedback (and the fear of attaining
less favourable feedback) may hence produce subjects who eschew, and no longer
embrace, risks. Sadly, regardless of how ‘responsible’ lecturers become, good student
feedback is not guaranteed as:
a subject construed and constructed as human capital both for itself and for a firm or state
is at persistent risk of failure, redundancy and abandonment through no doing of its own,
regardless of how savvy and responsible it is. (Brown, 2015, p. 37)
For instance, Steve, in an interview, remarks:
Interviewer So what was it like when the [other department] shut down?
Steve It was awful . . . I luckily managed to transfer over to [another university
department] but I felt . . . depressed about the whole thing . . . [Because] many
colleagues were . . . successful and hardworking academics . . . with publications
and everything but . . . um . . . not all of them managed to find a job afterwards or
they simply decided to retire . . . (Excerpt 14—Interview with Steve; teacher
educator)
Conclusion
This article utilised Foucault’s (2008, 2009) notion of governmentality to enquire
into the operation of the NSS. Since no research had hitherto investigated the NSS
through Foucault’s work, this article sought to add to existing Foucauldian studies in
the field of higher education (e.g. Morrissey, 2013) to show how student voice may
be instrumentalised towards governing an (academic) population. Importantly, this
article eschewed the perspective that Foucault was mainly interested in the ‘micro-
physics of power’ and, instead, demonstrated how power operates at both micro and
macro levels of scale (cf. Collier, 2009).
In summary, the NSS was first analysed as a ‘disciplinary technique of government’
which utilises ‘normalising judgements’ and ‘hierarchical observations’ to produce
increasingly compliant lecturer subjectivities who prioritise the achievement of high
student satisfaction. Second, Foucault’s analyses of liberal and neo-liberal ‘govern-
mentality’ were considered. It was argued that the NSS governs the academic popula-
tion by creating perpetual competition at various levels of scale, as lecturers,
departments and universities are pitched against one another in artificially created
‘markets’. This neo-liberal governmentality uses the principle of economic market
‘freedoms’ to simultaneously avoid large-scale academic unrest whilst producing
important collateral damage to function as ‘warnings’ along the lines of ‘look what
happens if you don’t produce good student feedback’. Importantly, this neo-liberal
governmentality governs the population by establishing competition in all spheres of
social life because, put crudely, people (such as lecturers) are less likely to challenge
the status quo if they are busy competing with one another.
On the premise that both disciplinary and neo-liberal governmentalities operate
within the NSS, the important question now emerges how these two governmentalities
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could be theorised together. Foucault (2009) already suggested not to think of
sovereignty, discipline and liberal governmentality as separate historical epochs where
‘a society of sovereignty’ is replaced by ‘a society of discipline’, which is then replaced
by a ‘society, say, of [liberal] government’ (p. 143). Rather liberal governmentality,
discipline and sovereignty should be seen as a triangle in which ‘disciplinary
techniques’ are ‘contemporaneous with’ and ‘bound up with’ liberalism (p. 143). That
is, only if the modes of liberal ‘laissez-faire’ and neo-liberal ‘competition’ prove
ineffective in producing ‘responsibilised’ subjects (Brown, 2015, p. 71), the
government may decide to actively intervene by subjecting individuals to discipline
(cf. Lemke, 2002). For example, lecturers may be free to do what they want in order
to produce good student feedback; however, if this feedback fails to materialise,
lecturers are subject to disciplinary power as was the case with Rachel (see excerpt 9).
However, contemporary HEIs—and society more generally—are part of a trend
which perhaps may not have been as prevalent in Foucault’s time: the global prolifer-
ation of rating and ranking practices as embodied in online services, such as ‘Trip
Advisor’ or ‘Airbnb’. Hence, it could be suggested that in the NSS (as one specific
instance of a rating and ranking technology), neo-liberal governmentality and
discipline may have morphed into a novel ‘amalgam’. This hybrid, which could be
described as a ‘neo-liberal disciplinarian governmentality’, is composed of artificially
created markets between universities (cf. neo-liberalism) which, nevertheless, operate
within tightly controlled, ranked and panoptic parameters (cf. discipline). More specif-
ically, neo-liberal governmentality may be at play in that universities, faculties,
departments, programmes and lecturers are pitched against one another in competitive
struggles over positive student ratings and thus, future student numbers and prospec-
tive income streams. Simultaneously, ‘disciplinary power’ is utilised in that the
government and senior management instrumentalise the ‘panoptic gaze’ of students in
order to ‘normalisingly judge’ lecturers and departments by ranking them within league
tables. Hereby, the primary aim is not the production of, for example, ‘better’ or
‘more critical’ lecturers or institutions, but the enhancement of institutional ‘perfor-
mance’ and ‘competitive standing’ (cf. neo-liberalism). If lecturers or institutions
perform well, they might become ‘winners’ (Brown, 2015, p. 41), but those who per-
form towards the bottom of the rankings are turned into ‘losers’ (cf. neo-liberalism).
These ‘losers’ may be put under additional surveillance—perhaps alongside meticu-
lous ‘support’—to make them, yet again, into docile and useful subjects (cf. discipline)
who are able to compete with the other lecturers (cf. neo-liberalism). At all times,
universitarean actors are under continuous pressure to enhance their ‘human capital’
to improve their competitive standing (neo-liberalism) within highly systematised and
clearly visible, panoptic rankings which, of course, operate through normalising
judgement (cf. discipline).
There is, nevertheless, one inherent danger in this critique of student satisfaction:
to posit students as seemingly all-powerful actors within the field of UK higher educa-
tion. Such a view would mistakenly neglect the multitude of further disciplinary and
neo-liberal technologies within the international university landscape, including those
which figure students at the receiving end of disciplinary technologies, such as perpet-
ual student assessment regimes (Raaper, 2016). In fact, it would be interesting to
investigate the NSS in the context of a perpetual and reciprocal disciplining cycle in
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which students discipline university lecturers (through SETs) and lecturers discipline
students (through conventional means of testing and examinations). (Again, this
reciprocal disciplining mirrors Airbnb rating practices, where both apartment hosts
and their guests rate one another.) Further complexity emerges when vocational
degrees are added into the analysis. For example, Ofsted appraisals of universities in
the context of UK initial teacher education (MacBeath, 2011) could be understood
as yet another disciplinary technology in which discipline filters down the university
hierarchy with students at the receiving end. In addition, many students are also
subjected more harshly to other effects of neoliberalism, such as an increasingly
uncertain employment future (Lopes & Dewan, 2014) within ruthlessly competitive
‘job markets’ (Srnicek & Williams, 2016). Hence, further research could now explore
how students and lecturers could jointly resist the neo-liberal disciplinary effects of
accountability technologies (e.g. grading practices and the NSS), instead of becoming
caught up in reciprocal rating and ranking games.
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